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If this case stands for the proposition that section 8(b)(1)(A)
cannot be used to regulate activities of unions against members,
as it appears to do, then it is a unique interpretation which may
have far-reaching effects.
By this decision, the union has gained a new source of strength
and the employee has lost a great measure of his freedom to
refrain from engaging in concerted union activities. The decision
has the effect of placing in the hands of the union a powerful
weapon which may be used to enforce their will upon the employee. Henceforth, the court enforced fine will no doubt deter
a great deal of rebellion within the inner ranks of the union. It
will certainly strengthen the union in its struggle against management. It may even have the long range effect of winning more
benefits for the worker. But the worker may find that these new
benefits are a poor substitute for the loss of individual freedom
which he will suffer because of this decision.
Thomas M. Chattin

Legislation-Validity of Special Acts When
A General Law Already Exists
The West Virginia Legislature passed a special act authorizing
the Greenbrier County Court to create an airport authority to
construct, maintain, and operate an airport. An airport authority
was created and construction of an airport begun. To finance the
construction of the airport, the airport authority authorized the
sale of revenue bonds. The Secretary of the airport authority was
the only officer empowered to sign the certificate authorizing the
sale of the bonds; he refused to do so. The airport authority brought
an original proceeding in mandamus to compel its Secretary to
sign the certificate. Prior to this a citizen of Greenbrier County
had instituted a civil action to have the act declared unconstitutional as contrary to article VI section 39 of the West Virginia
Constitution. The trial court declared the special act valid. Held,
reversed, writ denied. The existence of a general law relating to
airports indicates that the Legislature recognizes that a general
law is applicable to the subject. Therefore, since there is no
doubt that a general law is applicable, the necessity for a special
act is precluded, and the special act is void. The Legislature could
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have accomplished its objective by amending the general law which
relates to airports. State ex rel. Greenbrier County Airport Authority v. Hanna, 153 S.E.2d 284 (W. Va. 1967).
The principal case is the most recent decision of the West Virginia court where a special act of the Legislature has been declared
unconstitutional under the prohibition against special acts when
general laws could be made applicable. The question arises: what
criteria does the court consider when determining the constitutionality of a special act?
First, it must be decided whether a given statute is general or
special. A statute is general when it applies to all persons, places,
relations, or things within a specified class that is not arbitrary or
unreasonable.' But, the classification must reasonably and substantially resemble the objective which the Legislature seeks to
accomplish;2 and be open to receive potential members.' Further,
it must operate on all of the members of the class in a substantially
like manner.4 On the other hand, special statutes apply only
to individuals or to less than all of the members of a particular
class.' Special acts are an arbitrary separation of the members of
a class. One device the court uses to recognize this arbitrary
separation is ascertaining whether certain members of a particular
class are arbitrarily excluded or discriminated against.6 Local
laws are laws which are special with respect to place or geographical area." That is, all local acts are special, but special acts
are local only when they affect one particular geographic area.
The West Virginia Constitution of 1863 prohibited special legislation only when general laws were applicable. The purpose of
the prohibition was to prevent the abuse of the power vested in
the Legislature and require the Legislature to act by general laws
I State ex rel. Dieringer v. Bachman, 131 W. Va. 562, 568, 48 S.E.2d
420, 425 (1948).
2 State ex rel. Heck's, Inc. v. Gates, 149 W. Va. 421, 450, 141 S.E.2d
387 (1965).
3 Groves v. County Court of Grant County, 42 W. Va. 587, 596, 26
460,463
(1896).
4
Bent v. Weaver, 108 W. Va. 299, 301, 150 S.E. 738, 739 (1929).
5 Groves v. County Court of Grant County, 42 W. Va. 587, 596, 26
460,463 (1896).
6 Tweel v. W. Va. Racing Comm'n, 138 W. Va. 531, 546, 76 S.E.2d
883 (1953).
7 Groves v. County Court of Grant County, 42 W. Va. 587, 596, 26
460,463 (1896).
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Another purpose was to preserve

uniformity of legislation.9 In the constitution of 1872 eighteen
specific probitions were added to the section prohibiting special

acts when general laws could be made applicable." ° The Journal
of the Constitutional Convention of 1872 does not state why the
eighteen specific prohibitions were added. The prohibition against
a special act when a general law is practicable appears in the

West Virginia Constitution following an enumeration of the
eighteen specific prohibitions of article VI section 39 and states,

"[A]nd in no case shall a special act be passed, where a general
law would be proper and can be made applicable to the case ...""
The early decisions of the West Virginia court on the scope of

the general constitutional prohibition in section 39 held that the
applicability of a general law was a preliminary matter exclusively
within the jurisdiction of the Legislature and not reviewable by
the courts. 2 This position of the court nullified article VI section
39 of the constitution as a restriction upon the power of the
Legislature because it left the power to determine the constitution-

ality of special legislation solely with the Legislature-the very
body which the provision was designed to restrict. Later, in Brozka

v. County Court of Brooke County, 3 the West Virginia court took
the position that while the Legislature was generally the sole

judge of the applicability of a general law to a specific situation,
the court can void the act when it clearly appears that a general

law would accomplish the purpose as well.

4

Thus by asserting

8 111 DEBATES AND PROCEEDInGs OF FiRST CONSTITUTIONAL

CONVENTION

V. VA. (1861-1863) 831. For a discussion of special legislation, see Cloc
and Marcus, SPECIAL AN LOCAL LEGIsLATION, 24 Ky. L.J. 351 (1936); Horack
and Welsh, Special Legislation: Another Twilight Zone, 12 IND. L.J. 183
(1937); Note, Special Legislation in Virginia, 42 VA. L. REv. 860 (1956);
Note, Special Legislation in West Virginia, 39 W. VA. L. REV. 255 (1933).
9State ex rel. Rickey v. Sims & Talbott, 122 W. Va. 29, 32, 7 S.E.2d 54,
55 (1940).
10 Kanawha County Public Library v. County Court of Kanawha County,
143 W. Va. 385, 400, 102 S.E.2d 712, 721 (1958).
"W. VA. CONST. art. VI § 39 states:
The legislature shall provide, by general laws, for the foregoing
and all other cases for which provision can be so made; and in no
case shall a special act be passed, where a general law would be
proper, and can be made applicable to the case, nor in any other case
in which the courts have jurisdiction, and are competent to give the
relief asked for.
12 Herold v. McQueen, 71 W. Va. 43, 47, 75 S.E. 313, 315 (1912); Casto
v. Upshur County High School Board, 94 W. Va. 513, 517, 119 S.E. 470,
472, (1923).
13 111 W. Va. 191, 160 S.E. 914 (1931).
,4Id. at 195, 160 S.E. at 916.
OF
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a right to determine whether the Legislature had exceeded its
powers, the court established a right of judicial review in the
area of special legislation. This decision made article VI section
39 of the constitution an effectual restriction on the power of the
Legislature.
As stated, the principal case is the most recent of a number of
cases in which the court has ruled on the constitutionality of a
special act. However, the principal case seems to be a departure
from the court's position in two leading West Virginia cases
concerning the validity of special acts-Meisel v. Tri-State Airport
Authority'" and Kanawha County Public Library v. County Court
of Kanawha County.'6 Each of the three cases had a similar factual
basis, but in both Meisel and Kanawha County Public Library the
special acts were upheld, while in the principal case the special
act was declared void.
In Meisel a citizen brought an action to have the special act
creating the Tri-State Airport Authority declared unconstitutional
and enjoin the same authority from performing any acts under
the auspicies of the special law. This special law created the TriState Airport Authority; provided for its membership, acquisition
of property and tax exemption, construction, operation and maintenance; and granted powers of eminent domain and issuance of
revenue bonds.'" The general statute already operating allowed
joint operation of an airport by two or more counties, cities, or
towns.'" However, the general statute did not suggest a way for
an airport to be jointly operated.' 9 The only factual difference
between Meisel and the principal case was that in the former, five
separate and distinct units of government-two counties, two cities,
and one town-and a private civic organization were involved
in the creation of the authority. While in the principal case only
the Greenbrier County Court was involved in the creation of the
airport authority. The distinction between Meisel and the principal
case was said by the majority to turn on the question of whether
a special act was necessary to adequately protect the rights of all
' 5 135W. Va. 528, 64 S.E.2d 32 (1951).
16 143 W. Va. 385, 102 S.E.2d 712 (1958).
1
'W.
VA. AcTs, 1949, c. 142, 639.
VA. CODE ch. 8, art. 11, § 5 (Michie 1943) provides: "One or
'aW.
more counties, towns or villages may join with another or other counties, cities,
towns and/or villages for the purpose of acquiring, leasing, equipping, constructing, maintaining and operating an airport or landing field....

19 Id.
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the parties involved in the creation of the airport authority."°
Federal funds were given to both airport authorities. The Civil
Aeronautics Administration requires a local sponsor as recipient of
a grant to insure that one entering into contractual relations with
the CAA can be forced to comply with the provisions of the grant,
e.g., non-discriminatory hiring. The special act in Meisel created
a local sponsor-the Tri-State Airport Authority. None of the six
parties involved in the creation of the Tri-State Airport Authority
was in any way subject to the control of any other party.2 ' Therefore, the CAA could not be sure that the requirements of the grant
would be met unless the party with whom it contracted had the
exclusive authority to control the operation of the airport. If only
one of the six parties had signed the agreement with the CAA,
the signatory party could only obligate itself and not any of the
other parties. In such an event the CAA would probably not grant
the necessary funds. By contrast, the Greenbrier County Court
had a high degree of control over the Greenbrier Airport Authority
because the county court selected and approved the members of
the airport authority.2 2 Therefore, in the principal case there was
no need for a special act to protect the rights of the parties
involved because the CAA could be assured of compliance no
matter which party signed the agreement. After looking at all of
the relations between the parties involved, the majority in the
principal case felt that a special act was necessary to protect the
rights of all of the parties concerned in Meisel, but not in the
principal case."
Judge Berry, dissenting in the principal case, argued that Meisel
is not distinguishable. He insisted that the court's position on the
two cases should be consistent. The Regional Airport Authority
Act was passed on March 8, 1967, the day after the case was
decided. " It is a general law under which the Tri-State Airport
Authority could have been organized. The general act specifically
states the manner in which an airport authority can be formed;
20 Meisel v. Tri-State Airport Authority, 135 W. Va. 528, 542, 64 S.E.2d
32, 40 (1951).
21 Id.
2 State ex rel. Greenbrier County Airport Authority v. Hanna 153 S.E.2d

284, 292 (W. Va. 1967).
23 Id.
4

W. VA. ACTS, 1967, c. 15, 57. This act was declared constitutional as
this article goes to press. State ex rel. Farley & Leadman, Conmm'rs v. Brown,
35 The Syllabus Service 30 (W. Va. 1967).
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defines its powers and obligations; regulates relations between
the parties involved; and expressly provides for entering into agreements with federal agencies. 2 Both the Tri-State and Greenbrier
Airport Authorities could have been organized under the Regional
Airport Authority Act. Therefore, it seems that Judge Berry was
correct in arguing that the two cases were not distinguishable, as
the majority held in the principal case. The dissenting opinion
further questions the decision of the majority because it purports
to follow the canon that a reasonable doubt as to unconstitutionality
of a statute must be resolved in favor of the validity of the law.
Judge Berry argues that a reasonable doubt would seem to exist
when two of a five-member court cannot agree with the majority.
Judge Berry points out that airports created by special acts in
other counties will probably be unconstitutional. This can create
difficult situations. However, these airports can reorganize under
the Regional Airport Authority Act. But if a special act on some
other subject is declared unconstitutional in the future, what remedy
will be available to persons operating under similar special acts?
In the Kanawha County Public Library case the special act
established a public library; created a board to operate it; and
provided a stable method for financing the library." The act
specified that the financial support of the public library would
be provided for by a special tax. This tax was to be levied by
the city, county court, and school board upon the written request
of the library board.27 The general statute already in force was
essentially the same as the special act except that the general law
did not make it mandatory that public libraries be established in
every county. 8 The library brought an original proceeding in
25

W. VA. AcTs, 1967, c. 15, 57.
1957, c. 178, 785.

26
W. VA. Ac's,
27
1d. at 787.
28

W. VA. CODE ch. 10, art. 1, § 1 (Michie 1955) provides: "The term
'governing authority' shall be construed to mean county court, county board
of education or the governing body of the municipality." W. VA. CODE ch.
10, art. 1, § 2 (Michie 1955) provides:
A governing authority, either by itself or in cooperation with one or
more other such governing authorities, shall have the power to
establish, equip and maintain a public library, or to take over,
maintain or support any public library already established. Any
library established, maintained or supported by a governing authority
may be financed either (1) by the appropriation from the general
funds of the governing authority of a sum sufficient for the purpose,
or (2) by the imposition of an excess levy for library purposes, m
accordance with the provisions of section sixteen, article eight,
chapter eleven of this Code.
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mandamus to force the Kanawha County Court to appropriate funds
and pay to the library in accordance with the special act. The
difference between Kanawha County Public Library and the principal case is that they were decided on different portions of the
pertinent constitutional provision. Kanawha County Public Library
was argued and decided on the specific prohibition of article VI
section 39 against the passing of a special act which interferes with
county affairs. 9 The principal case was decided on the general
portion of section 39 which prohibits special acts only when a
general law is applicable." It is a distinction between total and
partial prohibition. In Kanawha County Public Library, the court
said the special act was not in interference with county affairs
because it did not change an existing situation within the county.
Rather, the special act created a new situation with a new set of
relations.3 ' The court in the Kanawha County Public Library
decision hints that even had the case been decided on the general
portion of section 39, the result would have been the same.
The objective of the Legislature in the Kanawha County Public
Library case-the mandatory creation of a pubic library in Kanawha
County-dealt with a unique situation. The Legislature obviously
did not feel that it was necessary to establish a public library in
every county.2 Because the existing act concerning public libraries
does not make the creation of public libraries mandatory, there is
no presumptive evidence of the applicability of a general law on
the subject, that is, that every county should be required to maintain a public library. This means that consideration of the necessity
for a special act is not precluded.
It appears that a special act will and should be declared void
in most situations if there is an existing general law dealing with
the subject. However, there may be an exception when the circumstances of a particular situation are unique, and there remains
no other way to accomplish a proper exercise of legislative power.
In the cases discussed the facts are so similar, the distinctions so
slight, and the reasoning so close that there may exist substantial
29 See Kanawha County Public Library v. County Court of Kanawha
County, 143 W. Va. 385, 393, 102 S.E.2d 712, 717 (1958).
30 See State ex rel. Greenbrier County Airport Authority v. Hanna, 153
S.E.2d 284,288 (W. Va. 1967).
31 Herold v. McQueen, 71 W. Va. 43, 47, 75 S.E. 313, 315 (1912).
32 Kanawha County Public Library v. County Court of Kanawha County,
143 W. Va. 385, 391, 102 S.E.2d 712, 716 (1958).
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doubt among the members of the bench and bar of West Virginia
as to the state of the law with respect to the validity of special acts,
when a general law, dealing at least partially with the subject
of the special law, already exists.
James Edward Seibert

Sentence and PunishmentHarsher Penalties Following Habeas Corpus Relief
D was indicted and pleaded guilty to two separate counts of
attempted armed robbery and received two concurrent ten year
prison terms. After exhausting his state remedies, D received
habeas corpus relief from a federal district court, and his case
was remanded for a new trial. In the second trial before a different
judge, D's case was submitted to two different juries on the
separate felony charges. D was found guilty on both charges, and
the sentencing judge gave two fifteen year terms which were to
run consecutively. D petitioned the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals for a writ of habeas corpus. The petition was denied
without hearing. D then petitioned the United States District Court
for federal habeas corpus. Held, petition denied. The authority
of the sentencing judge must not be curtailed so long as the harsher
sentence imposed is not the product of retributive intent on the
part of the second sentencing judge. Shear v. Boles, 263 F. Supp.
855 (N.D. W. Va. 1967).
The recent expansion of constitutional limits on state criminal
proceedings' has created difficult problems for the federal habeas
corpus court. A major task confronting the court is to reconcile
the broadly principled demands of the United States Constitution
with the practical aspects of post-conviction relief. That is, in addition to protecting the individual's constitutional rights, a federal
court must extend such protection within the existing judicial
system. In the principal case, fearing a usurpation of the trial
court's function, the Shear court upheld the imposition of a harsher
sentence on the successful habeas corpus applicant.
I See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (privilege against
self-incrimination); Excobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Gideon v.
Wainwrigbt, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
(right to counsel at all stages of litigation); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
1956). (right to transcript on appeal).
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